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ONTARIO’S ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL CLUSTERS: A 
GLASS HALF-FULL OR HALF-EMPTY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
JUSTICE? 
 
LORNE SOSSIN* AND JAMIE BAXTER** 
 
 
A  INTRODUCTION 
 
As Peter Cane recently observed, far too little attention has been devoted to 
administrative justice.1 While in some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom (UK), 
adjudicative tribunals fall under the supervision of the judiciary, in Canada, the Supreme 
Court has confirmed that all tribunals, even if their sole task is adjudication, are a 
part of the executive branch of government, established by statute to further a 
policy objective.2 Governments in Canada continue to experiment with different 
organisational models in their attempts to balance the policy mandate of tribunals with 
their adjudicative function, while working to improve accessibility for users and the 
quality of decision making. By examining the ongoing evolution of tribunal reforms, we 
believe both the possibilities and limits of administrative justice may be better 
understood. 
The provincial government of Ontario in Canada took a revealing first step to 
organize its kaleidoscopic system of administrative agencies, boards and commissions 
when it proclaimed the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and 
Appointments Act (Tribunals Act) in the spring of 2010.3 The Tribunals Act proposes a 
novel strategy for structural reform called tribunal clustering, which groups related 
tribunals together, but keeps their respective statutory mandates and memberships intact 
and encourages them to connect along a range of shared characteristics. The resulting 
cluster organisations aim to capture intersections in tribunals’ logistical, procedural, 
 and substantive adjudicatory features and to reinforce links between constituencies of 
tribunal users. 
These clusters are taking shape at a time when tribunal system restructuring has 
emerged as a priority in several Commonwealth countries. Compared to recent 
changes in the UK and to widespread tribunal amalgamations in Australia at both 
federal and State levels, Ontario’s clustering model offers a unique strategy for reform—
but one for which the long-term vision remains unclear, or at least it appears to be 
incomplete. In this paper we explore the resulting gaps and uncertainties in this 
strategy. Using modernisation efforts in Australia and the UK as a counterpoint, we 
argue that Ontario’s strategy is founded on a distinctive idea of institutional change 
designed to make the tribunal system flexible, more adaptive and thus progressively 
more effective at delivering administrative justice services to its users. That said, tribunal 
clusters in our view represent an important step but not a final destination. 
The need for such change is evident. Claimants who come to administrative 
tribunals in Canada, as elsewhere, expecting a convenient forum to resolve their 
problems may discover that institutional resources and expertise, their own 
knowledge of the system, and their statutory entitlements and legal rights are 
fragmented between bodies with diverse norms and mandates. At least from a birds-
eye view, the tribunal ‘system’ now looks more like an ad hoc assortment of isolated 
institutions rather than a coherent system of justice. Increasingly, it seems that the very 
structures and modes of organisation behind the delivery of administrative justice 
may actually pose barriers for users, even as they separate individual tribunals from the 
shared knowledge, practices and infrastructure that a more rational and explicitly 
coordinated administrative justice system would have to offer. The challenge now 
squarely in front of reformers is to identify suitable approaches to institutional 
change that will thread these disparate elements into a more coherent whole. 
That challenge is also a reflection of broader trends in the shifting context of 
 modern governance. As Andrew Gamble and Robert Thomas have recently 
observed in the UK:4 
Government is certainly not disappearing in the UK or anywhere else, but the context in 
which governments operate has been transformed, as they grapple with profound challenges 
arising from globalisation, Europeanisation, the modernisation of the administration and 
organisation of government, and an evolving constitution. As a result of these changes, 
governance is becoming more fragmented and diversified and as a result it is much harder for 
both politicians and citizens to understand the process of governing. 
 
Ontario shares in the problems that this evolving context raises for the delivery of 
administrative justice, but the province’s response has been distinctive, perhaps unique, 
compared to strategies enacted elsewhere. 
The idea behind tribunal clusters in Ontario traces its origins to the Agency Cluster 
Project, launched in 2006 with the appointment of Kevin Whitaker (now Justice 
Whitaker of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice) as facilitator to work with five 
environmental and land use planning tribunals to explore possibilities for mutual 
reforms. The project’s stated purpose was to identify ways to exploit overlaps between 
the different tribunals, in order to improve their independence in decision-making, their 
effectiveness from a user perspective, and their accountability. A key constraint, 
however, was to achieve these objectives without compromising or collapsing the 
separate legislative mandates of each constituent tribunal.5 Further, there appeared to be 
little appetite in the province for reforms that would alter the jurisdiction of 
participant tribunals, and thus the Cluster Project was limited to operate within 
bounds of existing legislative frameworks. 
Whitaker’s final report introduced the tribunal cluster as ‘the grouping together of 
different tribunals that work in related areas and deal with related subject matter’.6 
The goal of clustering, according to the report, was ‘to improve the quality of 
services offered to the public by sharing resources, expertise and administrative 
 and professional support’.7 This original vision for tribunal clusters then emerged in the 
Tribunals Act as a surprisingly open-ended idea. Section 15 of the Act provides that 
the province may designate two or more adjudicative tribunals as a cluster if ‘the 
matters that the tribunals deal with are such that they can operate more effectively and 
efficiently as part of a cluster than alone’.8 But a detailed description both of what a 
cluster ‘is’ and any specific criteria that describe when it is appropriate to form a 
cluster are conspicuously absent from the Tribunals Act. Nor are the rationales behind 
the cluster concept clarified in the wording of the Act or by nature of the legislative 
scheme overall.9 For these, we find it necessary to look further afield. 
Specifically, the austerity of the Tribunals Act as drafted raises a key question going 
forward: on what basis should individual tribunals be connected within a cluster? In 
other words, how can we predict when tribunals will operate more ‘effectively’ and 
‘efficiently’ as part of a cluster than alone? A more complete answer to this question 
will be crucial for new cluster organisations as they arise and continue to evolve. 
To date, the Tribunals Act has borne two clusters markedly different in 
composition: Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario (ELTO) in April 2010, and 
Social Justice Tribunals Ontario (SJTO) in January 2011.10 ELTO brings together 
five tribunals with overlapping subject matter expertise in land use planning, 
assessment and expropriation, heritage conservation, and environmental regulation. 
SJTO encompasses six tribunals responsible for a diverse range of subject matters but 
serving a common constituency of users vulnerable to social injustices. Each cluster 
operates as an independent organisation and is led by its own Executive Chair. As we 
discuss in more detail below, the differences between these two organisations illustrate 
that the question of when tribunals should form a cluster is one to be answered with 
reference to the tribunals’ existing capacities and to the goals that each particular 
cluster is trying to achieve. 
That question also leads to—and, to some extent, presupposes—a more basic inquiry 
 into the systemic challenges that clusters are designed to confront. Are these clusters 
in reality just a convenient cost-saving exercise? Certainly, clustering tribunals may give 
rise to efficiencies. Rather than four payroll offices or four registrars, a cluster of 
four tribunals may need only one payroll office and one registrar. Everything from 
renting space to information technology procurement may be more cost effective for 
larger clustered tribunals than for smaller individual ones. That said, integrating 
disparate systems and equipment may also give rise to short term costs. The key point, 
in our view, is not whether clusters are more efficient than individual tribunals 
operating in isolation but rather, who benefits? If the savings from clustering are 
reinvested in enhancing the quality of administrative justice, then the beneficiaries will 
be the tribunals themselves and, more importantly, the parties who come before them. 
If, however, savings are siphoned off into general revenues, then the clustering exercise 
would indeed be vulnerable to the critique that it is motivated by fiscal rather and 
qualitative criteria. 
We argue that the cluster concept may present an effective, user-focused 
strategy to address some of the basic challenges of fragmentation that plague 
modern systems of administrative justice. Clusters share several elements in 
common with a trend toward system-wide amalgamation pioneered in Australia and 
recently adapted in the UK, but tribunal clusters also have some unique features of 
their own. Most significantly, the clustering strategy allows the administrative 
justice system to retain a certain degree of flexibility and dynamism, with clusters 
afforded the freedom to develop their own organisational cultures and institutional 
mandates tailored to the particular needs, demands and capacities of the tribunals’ 
users groups and memberships. The cluster model also motivates tribunals to realise 
these goals on a continuous basis, rather than locking tribunal organisation into a 
particular pattern that will be unresponsive to the needs of its user populations in the 
future. 
 Tribunal clusters have been contemplated in New Zealand and attempted in at least 
one instance in the United States, but to our knowledge the cluster concept has not yet 
been defined in any detail nor has it been the subject of a comparative analysis.11 We 
think Ontario’s new Tribunals Act offers a good opportunity to do just that. In section 
B of this paper we address the questions of why tribunal clusters might be useful 
models for reform and when this strategy should be deployed to connect tribunals 
within a cluster. We begin by reflecting on some of the core challenges that tribunal 
modernisation and reform efforts seek to confront, each of which relate to existing 
patterns of fragmentation in the delivery of administrative justice. We then connect 
these patterns to some of the basic rationales behind the clustering strategy, and use 
this context to assess what Ontario’s two new tribunal clusters reveal about the basis for 
clustering. In section C we examine the tribunal cluster concept in more depth and 
canvas the various factors that distinguish this approach from other reform strategies. 
In section D, we draw on experiences with tribunal amalgamation in Australia to 
produce some preliminary insights into various techniques that tribunal clusters 
might employ to realise reform goals, and conclude with our view on the continued 
evolution of the cluster model toward the ultimate destination of administrative justice. 
 
 
B MODERNISING TRIBUNAL SYSTEMS 
 
The goal of modernising administrative tribunal systems is ultimately to improve access 
to justice for users.12 As the costs associated with traditional court-centred legal 
processes have grown, so has the popularity of administrative tribunals in the view of 
both policy makers and various user communities. Individuals are looking to these 
tribunals as simpler and more economical avenues to review administrative decision 
making and to resolve their disputes, free from the many formal trappings of the law 
 courts—a trend which is likely to continue as the cost of access grows as a concern, not 
only for socially and economically disadvantaged individuals but also for the politically 
significant middle class.13 
Access to justice is, however, a heterogeneous ideal characterised by at least three 
different dimensions of accessibility relevant to administrative justice reform.14 The 
first of these is formal access to the tribunal process itself, as determined by 
agency rules about legal standing to bring claims and by the procedures that 
govern how a tribunal conducts its hearings. Second, access to legal or other 
knowledge relates to whether and how individuals will be able to navigate the tribunal 
system and obtain services from a given tribunal. This type of access is influenced by 
operational guidelines and policies, a tribunal’s use of language and the availability of 
translation and assisted services, the ability to self-represent, the simplicity of a 
tribunal’s procedures, and the availability of past decisions to the general public. Third, 
access to the resources needed to participate in the tribunal system will be a core 
consideration for many users. The level of resources required for authentic 
participation in the tribunal system will depend both on the availability of subsidised 
assistance and on the costs associated with participation, including costs of 
representation, administration fees, and the rules governing cost awards. 
Unfortunately, even while individual administrative tribunals are promoted as 
simpler, more efficient and more expert in particular subject matters than courts, 
fragmentation within tribunal systems continues to thwart these basic dimensions of 
access for users in several ways.15 Consider the low-income individual in Ontario 
who faces a challenge in obtaining social benefits and is in a dispute with her landlord. 
That individual needs to navigate both the Social Benefits Tribunal and the Landlord 
Tenant Board’s procedures and rules. These two tribunals may operate in separate 
buildings and use different forms. They may employ different styles of adjudication and 
they may have divergent or even clashing organisational cultures. As a result, the user is 
 forced to navigate a set of institutional silos which impose high financial and 
informational costs and likely impede the overall quality of justice services that the 
tribunals can offer.16 
The New Zealand Law Commission has reported a ‘lack of overall coherence’ in 
many tribunal systems, making individual tribunals increasingly difficult for users to 
understand and navigate as interrelated institutions, and vulnerable to claims that they 
fail to deliver administrative justice in cost-effective ways.17 That conclusion echoes 
earlier comments by Sir Andrew Leggatt in his review of the UK’s tribunals in 2001: 
most tribunals [in the UK] are entirely self-contained, and operate separately from each other, 
using different practices and standards. It is obvious that the term “tribunal system” is a 
misnomer . . . each tribunal has evolved as a solution to a particular problem, adapted to one 
particular area.18 
One obvious outcome of this fragmented landscape is that the sheer number of 
administrative tribunals—each with their own physical and logistical 
infrastructure—represents a considerable duplication of resources and prevents 
smaller tribunals from achieving economies of scale.19 In a survey preceding its report 
on tribunal reform, the New Zealand Law Commission counted over 100 specialist 
tribunals and courts in that country alone,20 while Leggatt considered 70 different 
tribunal bodies within the scope of his review.21 Despite opportunities for some tribunals 
to share their resources many remain operating in isolation, likely in part because 
each tribunal is or perceives itself to be limited by its enabling legislation and by 
the associated mandates of a particular government ministry. Likewise, individual 
tribunals are each responsible for designing and implementing their own practices and 
procedures, making it difficult for users of more than one tribunal to access knowledge 
and to operate between them. This can be particularly frustrating for users when a single 
dispute concerns more than one tribunal—for example, where land use, planning and 
environmental regulatory issues coincide.22 
 On a more basic level, the complexity of tribunal systems may impair public 
awareness of which tribunals exist in the first place, what they do, and how to go about 
accessing them.23 As the UK government acknowledged in its White Paper responding 
to the Leggatt review: 
existing systems of redress do not take people’s problems as a whole. Instead they break 
them down into types and generally insist that people analyse what sort of redress they need and 
choose the appropriate route. It is rather as if a travel agent insisted on knowing whether you 
want to go by aeroplane, train or ferry before asking what your destination is.24 
To the extent that fragmentation impairs the public’s understanding about 
available options, potential users might never even find their way to the front door. 
Empirical work by Hazel Genn and others also suggests that these barriers to 
knowledge may disproportionately impact users who belong to marginalised groups.25 
The ad hoc evolution of administrative tribunal systems has likewise created serious 
discontinuities in how individuals’ legal rights are determined and has disrupted the 
flow of knowledge between adjudicators themselves, ‘leading to a lack of consistency 
and in some cases arbitrary decision-making’.26 Training standards for tribunal 
members currently vary widely between different agencies, leading to inconsistent 
opportunities for members to engage in professional development and learning. In 
both procedural and substantive dimensions, the current landscape of public 
administration also makes it difficult for adjudicators with different but interrelated 
areas of expertise to interact and develop common understandings and approaches. 
Combating fragmentation is therefore about more than maximising the efficiencies 
of resource use; it is also fundamentally about improving the quality and consistency 
of review to fulfill the guiding principle of procedural fairness. 
Fragmentation similarly hinders first-instance decision-makers from learning more 
effectively from the decisions of review tribunals. A more coherent system would 
improve the quality of first-instance decisions by facilitating better feedback processes 
 from tribunal adjudication, allowing judgments from all related tribunals to inform 
administrative decision making in the future. Certainly, some authors have questioned 
whether appeal decisions issued by tribunals have traditionally had much effect on 
the quality of first-instance decision making.27 Addressing the problems associated 
with fragmentation in the tribunal system may be one response to this disconnect. 
Over time, a system that fosters better first-instance decisions will tend to rely less 
on appeals or judicial review, enhancing access to justice by lowering costs and the 
time required to achieve a just outcome. Moreover, fragmentation in determining legal 
rights likely makes it more difficult for tribunals to maintain decision-making 
independence from their respective ministries. A system of atomised tribunal bodies 
operating in relative isolation likely creates more opportunities for departmental capture 
and makes it difficult to impose and regulate the shared principles of transparency 
and openness that can flow from greater independence. 
 
1 Responses to Fragmentation in Australia and the UK 
Australia and the UK, as two large common law jurisdictions with a shared history 
of administrative state expansion following the Second World War, provide helpful 
comparative insights with respect to contemporary reforms in administrative justice. 
System-wide reform efforts in these countries have attempted to address the various 
aspects of fragmentation that plague modern administrative states. The earliest of 
these initiatives was to establish the federal Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) 
in Australia in 1976 following a pioneering report by the Commonwealth 
Administrative Review Committee chaired by Sir John Kerr.28 At that time, the Kerr 
Committee sketched a picture of an administrative justice system that was 
uncoordinated, contained many gaps, and was not easily understood by its 
constituents.29 The ultimate product of the Committee’s report, the Administrative 
Tribunals Act, created a generalist tribunal to review administrative decisions which 
 today has jurisdiction to conduct merits review under a wide variety of more than 400 
Acts of the federal Parliament.30 
The AAT also exercises an appellate function with respect to the decisions of a few 
remaining specialist tribunals in the areas of social security and veterans’ benefits.31 In 
1995, Australia’s Administrative Research Council recommended that the federal 
government create a new two-tier Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) to replace 
the AAT, providing for an internal appellate structure and further integration of the 
remaining independent tribunals. Although the government accepted this proposal in 
principle, resistance to the idea ultimately defeated legislation in 2003 that would have 
realised the reforms.32 
While a small number of specialist federal tribunals still exist in Australia, the 
outcome of the AAT model has been to centralise merits review of first-instance 
decisions within a single organisation that includes a membership of appointed judges, 
lawyers, and experts in various fields such as medical practitioners, engineers and planners. 
This ‘super tribunal’ model has been replicated at the State level in Australia, although 
these tribunals have taken on a variety of different forms in practice. The jurisdiction 
of the Victoria Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) extends beyond merits 
review into human rights and some civil claims. The VCAT’s organisational structure 
appears to be somewhat more nuanced compared to the AAT, and we draw several 
parallels between VCAT’s model and that of tribunal clusters in Ontario later in this 
paper. Western Australia’s State Administrative Tribunal was not established until 
2004, but closely tracks the structure of the VCAT.33 Jurisdiction over merits review and 
dispute settlement in New South Wales remains more fragmented compared to Victoria 
and Western Australia, although the State’s Administrative Decisions Tribunal 
(ADT), established in 1997, was designed to act as an amalgamated generalist review 
body. Some of the differences between the VCAT and ADT models are discussed in more 
detail below in section D. 
 Tribunal system reforms have also received considerable attention in the UK, 
motivated most recently by Sir Andrew Leggatt’s review of the tribunal system in 2001.34 
The Leggatt Report recommended that tribunals in the UK be collected together under 
one umbrella and administered by a new agency reporting to the Lord Chancellor.35 
That report received a favourable response from the government in its 2004 White 
Paper.36 The White Paper addressed several core concerns raised by Leggatt, 
including the physical accessibility of tribunal locations, access to process and 
knowledge, the independence of tribunals from their sponsoring departments and the 
overall quality of decision-making. The government also noted that some of the 
barriers inhibiting reform were rooted in current patterns of organisation within the 
system itself and observed that ‘present arrangements are highly fragmented, with each 
department, agency or tribunal responsible for trying to make improvements within its 
own sphere of operation’.37 These concerns proved serious enough to motivate political 
intervention and broad structural change. The UK Tribunals Service was 
established as an ‘Executive Agency’ in April 2006, and the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007 (TCEA) was enacted the following year, creating a single, 
unified agency with a two-tiered structure beginning in November 2008.38 To lead this 
new agency, the TCEA provides for a Senior President of the Tribunal Judiciary 
charged with taking account of the need for tribunals to be accessible, fair, quick, 
efficient, expert in their subject matter, and innovative in developing methods to resolve 
disputes.39 Most recently, in 2011, the Tribunals Service joined with the Courts Service 
to form Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS). This body operates 
under a Framework Agreement between the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice 
and the Senior President of Tribunals to support the administration of both courts 
and tribunals in the country.40 
The two amalgamated tribunal bodies created under the TCEA parallel the 
Australian reforms in the mid-1970s and subsequent refinements of that model at the 
 State level, although its two-tier structure appears to be unique in some respects. 
The new First-tier Tribunal of HMCTS conducts first instance review of the decisions 
of public administrators. It has acquired the jurisdiction of the bulk of administrative 
tribunals in the UK, with the notable exception of the system of planning appeals, 
which remains a distinct process.41 The Upper Tribunal was established to rationalise 
the ‘haphazard’ network of appeal routes from first instance tribunals under the old 
system,42 and also exercises statutory jurisdiction to conduct judicial review. Each of 
these two tribunals retain a degree of specialisation within different ‘Chambers’, 
though judges and tribunal members can be cross-appointed between these divisions. 
The First-tier Tribunal consists of seven different chambers—Social Entitlement; 
Immigration and Asylum; Health, Education and Social Care; War Pensions and 
Armed Forces Compensation; Tax; General Regulatory; and Land, Property and 
Housing— with each having a Chamber President appointed by the Judicial 
Appointments Commission. The Upper Tribunal has four chambers: Administrative 
Appeals; Immigration and Asylum; Tax and Chancery; and Land. The Upper 
Tier’s Chamber Presidents, other than that of the Land Chamber, are appointed by the 
Lord Chief Justice.43 
In practice, Peter Cane observes that the new organisation of tribunal adjudication 
in the UK most closely reflects the two-tiered model proposed by Australia’s 
Administrative Research Council in the mid-1990s but later abandoned by the 
Australian government.44 The outcome for the UK, Cane argues, is a system not 
unlike that of conventional law courts. Australia, at least at the federal level, has so far 
resisted this trajectory in favour of model that sees amalgamated tribunal agencies as a 
‘distinct genus of adjudicatory institution’ that seek to maintain their pragmatic 
advantages in terms of speed, affordability and informality.45 
At root, each of these responses can be understood as attempts to re-imagine 
individual tribunals as part of a coherent and continuous system of administrative justice. 
 That perspective has taken some time to catch hold in Canada. According to Heather 
McNaughton: 
it was not until recently that governments and Canadian courts have started to conceptualise 
administrative tribunals dealing with such disparate interests as the protection of fundamental 
human rights, the issuance and transfer of quota for production of agricultural products, and 
property tax assessment, as being part of a system of justice.46 
One of the authors has traced this emerging view of administrative justice in 
Canada’s Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and the place of administrative decision-
makers within Canada’s constitutional order.47 Michael Adler has labeled this an 
‘administrative justice approach’ which recognises the important role of courts, 
tribunals, ombudsmen and other external redress mechanisms but also emphasises 
internal means of enhancing administrative decisions such as recruitment, training 
and appraisal processes, as well as standard setting and quality assurance systems.48 
That perspective represents a common thread among administrative justice 
reforms in several jurisdictions internationally. In its White Paper, the UK 
government acknowledged that ‘the sphere of administrative justice . . . embraces not 
just courts and tribunals but the millions of decisions taken by thousands of civil 
servants and other officials.’49 Tribunal reforms should, according to this view, 
concentrate on more than the final stage of dispute resolution, they should take into 
account the entire process ‘from the initial decision onwards’.50 
A countervailing consideration to whole system reform is that administrative 
tribunals must retain a degree of flexibility in order to accommodate and support their 
particular mandates and areas of expertise. McNaughton cautions that ‘[t]he 
temptation to one size fits all reforms fails to take into account the fact that the specialist 
areas delegated to administrative tribunals form the very basis for their existence in the 
first place.’51 The main challenge of tribunal reform might thus be seen as an attempt 
to modernise and rationalise administrative tribunal systems while respecting, 
 maintaining and promoting core principles of accessibility, pragmatism, and expediency. 
The key is to make the system coherent while keeping it ‘nimble’.52 
 
2 Why Tribunal Clusters? 
The need to strike a balance between system coherence and flexibility speaks to what is 
probably the tribunal cluster’s greatest promise as an ‘alternative’ strategy for 
administrative justice reform. In 2008, the New Zealand Law Commission produced 
a comprehensive report that evaluated tribunal clusters as one of six possible options 
for reorganising administrative tribunals at the national level. The Commission’s 
starting point to define tribunal clusters was to emphasise their ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances:53 
There is no abstract definition of the concept of a cluster. The idea of a cluster does not compel 
any particular level of integration or sharing of services . . . Rather, the cluster model can be 
designed in a nuanced way, reflecting the level of connectedness that is desired for each 
different cluster. We stress too that the extent of connection need not be the same for each 
cluster within the reform. There may, for example, be one cluster where the tribunals are 
closely connected in terms of common membership and procedures. This cluster may even 
merge some of the individual tribunals’ jurisdictions. On the other hand, another cluster could 
be a far looser grouping, with individual tribunals maintaining their own identities, sharing 
fewer members and having greater procedural variance among themselves. 
The Commission appeared to view the cluster concept as a central organising idea 
capable of accommodating the various functional objectives of reformers and the 
differing capacities of constituent tribunals. The Commission also saw that tribunal 
clusters should be principally designed to reinforce connections between existing 
tribunals based on their respective strengths and advantages. This search to identify 
and support the successful aspects of existing tribunals— rather than exclusively 
targeting current problems or shortfalls—is a significant departure from the 
 conventional wisdom that administrative tribunal reforms should mainly be focused 
on wiping away the system’s chaotic past and starting with an entirely clean slate.54 
On this view, what sets tribunal clusters apart from other strategies is that they are 
functionally designed to create the conditions for setting standards of excellence, 
improving the relationship between user groups, streamlining tribunal administration, 
and cross-pollinating approaches to adjudication across different areas of expertise. The 
more interesting question is therefore not ‘why tribunal clusters?’ but rather ‘why 
clusters and not simply “super-tribunals” like the AAT and VCAT in Australia or an 
integrated Tribunal Service as in the UK?’ In other words, if bigger is better, why take 
the half measure of creating a cluster? In our view, there are three important reasons 
why clusters make sense compared to the strategies employed in Australia and the 
UK. First, bigger may not always be better. Clusters allow tribunals, government 
and independent reviewers and academics alike to put that proposition to the test. 
For example, large-scale amalgamations may trade off flexibility and adaptability 
within the supertribunal in return for greater conformity across the organisation. 
Second, clusters allow for learning across and between tribunals. Tribunals previously 
in relationships with separate ministries can, in one cluster, highlight the best 
practices and procedures from each in order to give the cluster a distinct identity.55 Third, 
the structure of tribunal clusters may accurately reflect how users actually 
experience justice problems in some circumstances. National civil legal needs surveys 
conducted in several countries over the past decade have confirmed that recognisable 
patterns emerge in the ways that individuals experience multiple issues.56 The surveys 
reveal that specific problems tend to cluster together— meaning that, for example, 
an individual who experiences a housing problem would be more likely to also 
encounter challenges related disability benefits.57 Tribunals will adjudicate many of 
these clustered subject matters. This survey data suggest that tribunal systems might 
be more effective at addressing administrative justice problems if they are structured 
 to reflect the underlying needs of their users. Tribunal clusters offer one means of 
moving toward this outcome. 
That said, in our view, tribunal clusters are not a final destination for administrative 
justice reform; rather, they are a means for arriving at a more rational and coherent 
way of delivering administrative justice. This fluidity is, moreover, exactly what many 
tribunal systems may require to help them meet the complex challenges of 
fragmentation discussed above. Tribunal clusters are motivated by the idea that 
systemic reforms should concentrate on working out the most coherent system, in 
practice, on an ongoing basis. 
While some might regard their open-endedness as a liability for new clusters, others 
will see this as an inherent strength of the clustering model. By requiring the decision-
makers who are responsible for defining each cluster to confront the extant features of 
the group’s constituent tribunals, the cluster concept challenges leadership within the 
system to focus on areas for change or reform, but also on the strengths and best 
practices that have been developed by each tribunal in the past. A core tension within 
tribunal clusters is, and will likely continue to be, between recognising the separate 
statutory mandates of each constituent tribunal on the one hand and encouraging 
deeper substantive and procedural integration on the other. There is no doubt that the 
structural and organisational redesign of tribunals in the absence of substantive 
legislative reform represents one of the biggest challenges for cluster models. But 
placing too much emphasis on this tension is likely to detract from more pertinent 
questions: What areas of knowledge from each tribunal—substantive, normative, 
procedural—should be nourished and promoted across the cluster with reference to 
improving access to justice, what features of individual tribunals ought to be left 
unchanged, and what aspects are good targets for institutional reform? This approach is 
rooted in the notion that tribunals will bring valuable institutional knowledge that is 
worth being preserved and shared within the cluster, as well as challenges and 
 problems in need of reform. 
 
3 When to Cluster? 
Our conceptual starting point leads back to the question of when and on what basis it 
will be appropriate to group existing tribunals together within a cluster. Recall that 
Ontario’s Tribunals Act authorises the province to designate two or more adjudicative 
tribunals as a cluster if ‘the matters that the tribunals deal with are such that they can 
operate more effectively and efficiently as part of a cluster than alone’.58 Does this 
reference to the ‘matters that the tribunals deal with’ suggest that each tribunal’s 
core jurisdiction should be a central focus when designating a cluster? Whitaker’s 
original Agency Cluster Project report seems to reinforce this interpretation, suggesting 
that clustered tribunals should work in related areas and deal with related subject 
matter.59 But read in context of the pragmatic rationales that underpin clustering and 
its inherent flexibility as a reform strategy, a more expansive interpretation of the 
Tribunals Act seems warranted. 
Taken as a whole, these rationales imply that the overriding orientation of 
clustering should be instrumental rather than formalistic—that is, tribunals should 
be clustered whenever it is ‘efficient’ and ‘effective’ to do so. Such an instrumental 
approach no doubt requires policy makers to consider the subject matter of constituent 
tribunals in some cases, but also points to the character of tribunals’ user communities 
and to procedural, adjudicatory or administrative similarities as equally significant 
factors in deciding when it is appropriate to form a tribunal cluster.60 This approach 
also raises the interesting question of when it would not be efficient and effective for 
tribunals to cluster. One answer may be where a tribunal itself is already the product 
of amalgamation and so enjoys many of the benefits of clustering (for example, the 
Ontario Financial Services Tribunal was created through merging smaller tribunals 
responsible for pensions and insurance, while the Ontario License Appeals Tribunal 
 similarly arose through an amalgamation of smaller licensing tribunals). 
The two tribunal clusters formed under the Tribunals Act to date tend to 
support our instrumental interpretation of the Act, and the particular foundation of each 
cluster appears likely to vary depending on both the circumstances in and the goals for 
which each cluster is formed. Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario (ELTO) was 
the province’s first tribunal cluster, formally minted in April 2010 out of the five 
participant tribunals in the Agency Cluster Project: the Assessment Review Board, 
which deals with property tax assessment and tax appeals, the Board of Negotiation, 
which provides mediation in compensation disputes arising from land 
expropriations, the Conservation Review Board, which adjudicates disputes 
concerning designated heritage status properties and archaeological sites, the 
Environmental Review Tribunals, which handles a range of environmental disputes, and 
the Ontario Municipal Board, which hears appeals and applications on a wide range of 
municipal, planning and land-related matters. Following the Cluster Project and before 
the Tribunals Act was enacted, these tribunals were co-located in a common physical 
space and began to integrate some aspects of their administrative operations. ELTO’s 
formal designation as a cluster followed the appointment of an Executive Chair, who is 
also a cross-appointed member of each tribunal in the cluster, in November 2009 and the 
passage of the Tribunals Act that Fall.61 
ELTO’s tribunals deal with closely connected subject matters in the land and 
environment areas—two domains that increasingly overlap as regimes of 
environmental planning, conservation, and land use zoning control have become 
prominentfeaturesof Ontario’sregulatorylandscape.62 ELTO’susercommunities, on the 
other hand, are very likely to be highly segmented, and in some instances its user 
groups represent directly competing interests. Indeed, environmental regulators and 
conservation groups have frequently clashed with land developers over a range of 
concerns on the contested terrain of ‘sustainable development’. This concept provides 
 a prominent example of one subject matter that cuts across most if not all of ELTO’s 
tribunals. 
In a recent article, Michael Gottheil, former Executive Chair of ELTO, and Doug 
Ewart, ELTO’s Senior Advisor, indicate that a key focus in the new cluster has been to 
reinforce connections between the tribunals’ subject matters and contexts, and to 
promote the sharing of knowledge, experience and perspectives between constituent 
tribunals.63 ELTO is a good example of a cluster where the nature of the tribunals and 
their respective mandates offer good possibilities for innovations that improve the 
quality and consistency of decision-making on merits review, leading to better 
outcomes for tribunal users. 
A second set of six Ontario tribunals was recently brought together as part of Social 
Justice Tribunals Ontario (SJTO) in January 2011. This cluster includes the Human 
Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the Child and Family Services Review Board, the Custody 
Review Board, the Social Benefits Tribunal/Social Assistance Review Board, the 
Special Education Tribunals (English and French) and the Landlord and Tenant 
Board. In comparison to ELTO, SJTO’s tribunals deal with a much more diverse 
range of subject matters and most share little in the way of substantive overlap, although 
some, such as the Custody Review and Child and Family Review Boards, will likely 
cultivate important subject matter connections.64 As the SJTO’s name itself suggests, 
a primary motivation behind its formation has been to create a ‘single door’ 
institution for a shared community of users vulnerable to social injustice from a 
range of causes such as discrimination, physical and mental disabilities and economic 
disadvantage. The SJTO tribunals thus appear to have clustered around the socio-
economic characteristics and other identifying features of users, rather than the 
particular subject matters dealt with by the tribunals. 
Ontario’s two existing tribunal clusters indicate that the functional criteria of 
efficiency and effectiveness will likely have different reference points depending on the 
 circumstances in which the cluster is formed. ELTO’s experience reveals that subject 
matter jurisdiction will be central in some instances, while the new SJTO suggests that 
common characteristics of the cluster’s user communities will be a main focus in others. 
The New Zealand Law Commission has suggested that reformers should also pay 
attention to the nature of tribunals’ adjudicatory powers when contemplating how to 
group like tribunal together.65 The Commission noted that the core function of 
some tribunals is to review government decision-making, and distinguished these 
from other bodies dealing with inter partes disputes. 
The Commission’s study was careful to observe that the aspirations of each 
tribunal cluster, as well as the challenges it seeks to address, should shape how that 
cluster is designed. It also underscored the contested implications of ‘expertise’. 
Administrative lawyers frequently refer to the expertise of adjudicators in a particular 
field of knowledge, but rarely acknowledge expertise in certain procedures or 
techniques. One can imagine situations in which members’ specialised knowledge of 
subject areas converge (perhaps members from different tribunals all have a similar 
background in land use planning), pulling toward a common set of procedures and 
practices that would encourage cross-fertilisation between tribunals. But these same 
members’ expertise in specific forms of disputeresolution processes might diverge 
considerably, favouring more distinct procedural rules for each tribunal within the 
cluster. Alternatively, the form of dispute-resolution itself, such as an emphasis on 
inquisitorial processes or ADR techniques, rather than an adversarial approach, could 
stand as yet another basis for forming a cluster out of tribunals. 
 
 
C TRIBUNAL CLUSTER MODELS 
 
Having outlined the basic motivations behind the tribunal cluster model, we next describe 
 the actual structure of tribunal clusters in their various forms. It is useful to situate 
cluster-type arrangements along a spectrum that ranges from basic physical co-location of 
like tribunals, to tribunal clusters, to fully integrated tribunal amalgamation. In reality, 
actual tribunal clusters will tend not to occupy a specific point along this spectrum, but 
will likely mix and match some features of each approach to create context-specific 
arrangements. 
 
1 Co-location 
The most basic type of structural reform related to tribunal clusters is the co-
location model, whereby tribunals are brought together to share the same physical 
space and perhaps some overlapping logistical infrastructure. This model normally 
entails a ‘single door’ approach that allows users of the co-located tribunals to attend at a 
single location and gain information about the various procedures from constituent 
tribunals. On the back-end, co-located tribunals will generally each retain leadership 
and control over their own affairs, although some efficiencies in administrative 
collaboration may be available. Given that co-location is basically about logistical re-
organisation, this strategy can likely be employed without the need for new legislation 
authorising the structure. The statutory mandate and membership of each co-located 
tribunal in this model remain separate from those of other participating tribunals. 
In Australia, Robin Creyke has noted both the possibilities and limitations 
inherent in this approach: 
The advantages of the co-location model are that it preserves the status quo, retains the flexibility 
of a variety of specialist bodies, while permitting cost savings from use of a common registry 
and administrative infrastructure. The disadvantages are that it perpetuates the complexity and 
lack of coherence of the system, does not permit further savings other than those involved in 
co-location, and enhances the possibility of tribunal capture by its respective agency. This first 
option also denies the possibility for development of an administrative law jurisprudence across 
 tribunals on matters of common interest, such as, for example, the failure to notify citizens of 
decisions, the minimum content of statements of reasons, the circumstances in which tribunals 
can revisit their decisions, and when tribunals are estopped from acting.66 
Creyke’s assumptions about the limitations of a bare co-location model may hold in 
circumstances where there is little motivation to cultivate further connections between 
tribunals, but her analysis appears to be overly pessimistic about opportunities for 
procedural and substantive innovations insofar as they are applicable to clusters more 
generally. Creyke’s assessment may also gloss over some of the important nuances that 
can be built into co-location as one aspect of clustering. For example, considerations such 
as office geography, discussed below, can yield important influences on the ability to 
share knowledge and practices between tribunals. 
While co-located tribunals lack some of the more sophisticated organisational 
components granted to fully-fledged tribunal clusters, this model may represent a 
valuable starting point for further reforms within and between participant tribunals. 
Indeed, prior to the enactment of the Tribunals Act in Ontario, the five tribunals that 
later formed Environment and Land Tribunals Ontario began the clustering process by 
co-locating before becoming a cluster authorised under the new Act. Co-location may be 
particularly relevant in the Canadian context where sole tribunals face significant 
hurdles to provide adjudication outside of major urban areas. Co-located tribunals 
could have economies of scale to offer adjudication in a wider number of centres, or 
invest in better technology for remote access (such as video-conferencing) than sole 
tribunals. 
It will come as no surprise that physical co-location of tribunals is likely to be a 
central feature of most tribunal cluster arrangements. But research from Australia 
has gone further, to investigate the significance of designing the physical space within 
which constituent tribunals are situated. Insights in this area often seem to flow from 
basic common sense, but have apparently had an immediate impact on achieving the 
objectives of tribunal reform in Australia. 
 In her research work on this topic, Rachel Bacon emphasises the importance of 
shared spaces within the office environment, especially those in which the 
membership can interact on a daily basis.67 This was a central design feature of the 
VCAT’s new premises when they were designed for this new body. VCAT’s leadership 
made a conscious choice to ‘mix up’ the office spaces of members from the former 
specialist tribunals, with the expectation that this would contribute to breaking down 
cultural barriers. A similar strategy appears to be underway at ELTO, where 
adjudicators from all of the cluster’s tribunals have their offices on the same floor. This 
arrangement encourages informal conversation and knowledge sharing between 
adjudicators from different tribunals.68 
Virtual co-location is also likely to be significant. This includes both public 
websites that provide a single point of information access (even where the physical 
locations of constituent tribunals remain separate) as well as internal electronic 
information exchange and intranet sites that facilitate communication between 
tribunals. 
 
2 Institutionalising the Cluster 
As with co-location, each tribunal brings to a cluster its distinctive statutory and/ or 
policy mandate. But what sets clusters apart from bare co-location is the broader 
organisational umbrella that cuts across these jurisdictional divides and encompasses 
all tribunals within the group. Each tribunal cluster is an institution in its own right, with 
a shared leadership and administrative staff, memberships of adjudicators, and 
constituencies of users that are connected or overlap in identifiable ways. The 
cluster model offers the unique opportunity for these organisations to develop their 
own culture and adapt this to the particular needs and demands of their users over time. 
Tribunal clusters may be characterised by differing levels of complexity in each of these 
elements. Simpler clusters may operate as relatively horizontal organisations under a 
 single Executive Chair, without additional sub-groupings of related tribunals. These 
clusters will likely occupy a single location and have a single set of shared procedures. 
Simple clusters will inevitably prove to be the most straightforward to establish and 
administer, with minimal disruption of existing tribunals who form part of the cluster. 
More complex clusters might contain additional layers or higher-order levels of 
organisation as a way of variably defining the cluster’s connections according to sub-
groupings. For example, tribunals within a sub-group at one level may share related 
subject-matter jurisdictions, while that sub-group as a whole might share adjudicatory 
techniques with other sub-groups in the cluster. Alternatively, levels within a nested 
cluster might represent increasing areas of generality in subject-matter jurisdiction—for 
example, between environmental matters at one level and between environment and 
land-use matters at another. This type of model raises questions about tradeoffs between 
greater organisational complexity and the ability to define subgroups to create a more 
fine-grained structure. These sub-groupings may make the process of drawing 
connections between tribunals more straightforward and coherent, given that the needs 
and functions of some tribunals will fit more or less comfortably with each of the others 
in the cluster. However, greater complexity will invariably make the cluster more 
challenging to lead and administer, may increase cost, and may pose a risk to a unified 
organisation insofar as subgroupings create the possibility to form sub-cultures that 
entrench old ways of doing things rather than promote communication and knowledge 
sharing. Clusters will rarely remain static—rather, they may grow in complexity or 
simplicity over time in response to internal and external dynamics. 
Washington State’s Environmental Hearings Office (EHO) provides a good case 
study as to how a cluster model might evolve over time. Prior to reforms put into action 
in July 2011, the EHO housed a collection of five regulatory appeals boards dealing 
mainly with environmental controls and permits: Pollution Control Hearings, 
Shorelines Hearings, Forest Practices Appeals, Hydraulic Appeals, and 
 Environmental and Land Use Hearings. Together, these boards heard appeals from 
regulatory orders and decisions made by the Department of Ecology, the Department 
of Natural Resources, by local governments and by other agencies as provided by 
law. The Boards derived their jurisdiction from different governing statutes and 
designed their own practices and procedures. However, the boards were co-located, 
members of some boards were available to be cross-appointed between tribunals, and the 
overall structure of EHO admitted a degree of administrative and logistical integration. 
EHO’s original structure provided for a ‘level field’ on which each tribunal 
enjoyed—at least, formally—an equal position within the organisation. This idea of 
formal equality supports the overall purpose of a cluster in which tribunals retain and 
cultivate their own areas of expertise, while promoting shared knowledge and cross-
fertilisation between each unit. But the formal equality between tribunals within the 
cluster might also mask informal or operational hierarchies that create significant 
distinctions in the roles and influence of different tribunals. EHO’s experience in this 
regard is instructive. While that cluster was formally composed of five different boards, it 
appears that the Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB) was by far the most 
prominent tribunal within the cluster. The PCHB heard the largest proportion of cases 
coming to the EHO, its chair also sat as the head of the Shorelines Hearing Board, and 
he or she was the de facto director of the cluster’s administrative operations, although 
there is no common chair on the adjudicative side. Similar kinds of informal dynamics 
may influence the outcomes of possible structural reforms discussed in section D, below. 
For example, shared practices and an organisational culture that promotes active input 
from members of each tribunal in the cluster may be aimed creating greater equality 
between tribunals. 
State legislative changes enacted in March 2010 laid the groundwork to 
reorganise Washington’s system under a new cluster-type arrangement called the 
Environment and Land Use Hearings Office (ELUHO).69 The new ELUHO is 
 composed of two departments dealing with land use and environmental hearings 
respectively.70 A preliminary question about the evolution from EHO to ELUHO is 
whether the environment and land sub-groupings will be largely formal 
organising concepts or whether this arrangement will have significant practical 
implications for operating the cluster. The enabling legislation for the new cluster leaves it 
open as to whether the environment boards will have a common chair or individual 
chairs. It appears that a Chair responsible for the operation of the cluster as a whole 
will be appointed from the membership of either the land or environment sections, but 
that this Chair will not be cross-appointed to sit on tribunals for both sections. 
Inevitably, this model raises the spectre of competing visions for the mandate of the 
cluster—if a Chair from an environmental background is selected, will that suggest to 
the land use tribunal community that a particular substantive approach will dominate the 
cluster? In the case of ELTO, Ontario’s environment and land tribunal cluster, it is 
significant that the first Executive Chair was chosen from a background that was in 
neither the environmental or land use fields.71 
Washington’s ongoing experience with tribunal reforms may offer a good 
opportunity to track the evolution of a cluster model going forward. As we 
discussed in section B, a key aspect of tribunal clusters is their flexibility to adapt to 
changing needs and circumstances. ELUHO’s recent round of restructuring offers a 
good illustration of how such clusters might change over time, and underscores the 
opportunity for further inquiry into the factors that motivate or influence these 
dynamics and their impact on access to justice for users. 
 
3 Amalgamation 
A third model illustrates the fluid boundary between tribunal clusters and more fully 
integrated amalgams or ‘super tribunals’. Research into the actual structure and 
operation of these so-called super tribunals demonstrates that there is often no clear 
 distinction between a single amalgamated tribunal with divisional subgroupings or lists 
and a cluster of related tribunals that retain important aspects of their distinct 
mandates within the overall structure.72 The existing literature on tribunal reform might 
be criticised for obscuring this distinction by focusing almost explicitly on the concept 
of amalgamation, while ignoring contrasting or alternative concepts of clustering, even 
where the later would seem to be a more accurate label of the actual operation of the 
organisation. Nonetheless, as we explain below, tribunal clusters can still draw important 
lessons from this body of work. In this section we draw on two examples from 
Australia to help illustrate how amalgamated tribunals can differ dramatically from 
each other in practice, as we set the stage to apply insights derived from research on 
Australia’s super tribunals in section D. 
The VCAT and the ADT were created as State-level administrative bodies within 
a year of each other in the late 1990’s. On their face, both bodies are the result of 
system-wide attempts by their respective State governments to overhaul what was 
considered to be an ad hoc collection of specialist tribunals to create a single unified 
tribunal service, with a standard set of processes and a single public persona. The VCAT, 
however, is likely closer in organisation to a complex cluster than a unified 
amalgamation. It is divided into three main divisions—Civil, Administrative, and 
Human Rights—and each division is further sub-divided into subject matter lists. 
The core functions of the VCAT are defined under the VCAT Act, while the 
jurisdiction exercised by each list is conferred by portfolio legislation. The Civil and 
Human Rights Divisions operate as ‘court substitutes’ to adjudicate claims that were 
previously the domain of the Victorian Supreme Court, while the Administrative 
Division handles the review of government decisions under a range of statutes. The 
Administrative and Civil Divisions share one registry staff, excluding the Residential 
Tenancy and Guardianship Lists, which are each serviced by their own registry. 
While registry staff are divided into teams that service each list individually, tribunal-
 wide managers retain the flexibility to borrow staff from other areas according to 
workflow demands.73 
The President of the VCAT is a Judge of the Supreme Court. Individuals with legal 
qualifications dominate the VCAT’s membership, and each member is appointed 
for a five-year fixed-term. Well over half of the VCAT’s members are cross-appointed 
to more than one list. The Tribunal has discretion to regulate its own procedures, 
making it possible to adapt these to specific proceedings and the requirements of 
individual Lists. For example, the Guardianship List operates on an informal, 
inquisitorial basis, while complex tax matters are adjudicated in an adversarial manner, 
usually involving legal representatives. The VCAT’s flexibility to design its own 
procedures also allows it to implement some uniform operating procedures across the 
tribunal as a whole in order to promote shared approaches in some areas.74 
Compared to the VCAT, the ADT retains something of a dual personality as both a 
closely unified amalgam and a disjointed organisation within which its division retain 
separate and distinct memberships and procedures. In many respects, the overall 
organisation of the ADT is closer to a unified amalgam than a tribunal cluster. Much 
of the ADT’s work takes place within the General Division, which includes claims 
from a wide range of subject matters. The ADT also maintains a central registry 
responsible for the tribunal as a whole, and its enabling legislation offers relatively 
few opportunities to adapt tribunal-wide procedures to different divisions and 
circumstances. But in other respects, the ADT resembles a loose collection of 
tribunals and divisions that operate in isolated spheres of jurisdiction and practice. 
Divisional units such as the Community Services (child services and adoption 
regulations) and the Retail Leases Divisions, retain the distinctive identities of their 
previously independent tribunals. Cross-appointments between the ADT divisions 
are infrequent and certainly less common compared to the VCAT. Many of the current 
fragmentation problems at the ADT have been traced back to this lack of cross-
 appointments and shared knowledge.75 
In the end, semantic distinctions between broad-scale and generic tribunal clusters 
like VCAT and unified, or sometimes fragmented, bodies such as ADT are much less 
significant than the lessons which can be gleaned from studying the implications that 
flow from their various structural and procedural differences. The purpose of section 
D is to unpack these various structural components of tribunal clusters. 
 
 
D LESSONS AND NEXT STEPS 
 
A review of the existing literature on tribunal reform internationally reveals that very 
little work has been done that evaluates ‘best practices’ applicable to the cluster 
concept—either on its own or in comparison to other reform options. In other words, 
while it is interesting and worthwhile to compare reform models, in the absence of a 
comprehensive comparative literature that evaluates various models, is there a basis to 
prefer one over another? The academic literature which exists may be helpful in this 
regard. For example, in her doctoral thesis on amalgamating administrative 
tribunals, Rachel Bacon discusses specific outcomes of structural change in 
Australia over several key features for tribunal reform. Bacon’s project gathers lessons 
from her fieldwork, including first-person interviews of tribunal members and 
participants, to compare reform outcomes of the VCAT and the ADT in New South 
Wales. The following discussion attempts to translate relevant insights from this 
project into useful lessons for tribunal clusters in Ontario. 
At the outset we can identify a number of general components that are likely to 
determine the ultimate character of a particular cluster arrangement. In its 2008 study 
on tribunal reform, the New Zealand Law Commission identified six basic components 
of cluster models, including: shared administrative support and services, shared 
 membership (ie cross-appointed adjudicators), a common approach to procedures, and 
a cohesive overall leadership of the cluster.76 At least one additional feature might be 
added to this list. Physical co-location is very likely to be a feature of cluster 
arrangements. Indeed, co-location, as in ELTO’s case, may precede a more formal 
reorganisation of tribunals into a cluster. But additional aspects of the cluster’s 
physical space are also relevant, including office-space geography and the inclusion of 
shared spaces to increase membership interaction. 
We also note two further components of tribunal clusters that are not discussed in 
detail below, but which we flag for future research: (i) educational mechanisms for cross-
training members who sit on different tribunal within the cluster (as a means of 
enhancing quality, sharing experience, and developing a shared administrative culture) 
and (ii) the appointments process by which tribunal members are selected in the first 
place (so that the needs of the cluster, rather than its constitutive tribunals, may come to 
guide the process, including a commitment to transparent criteria, an emphasis on 
cross-appointments or lateral expertise, and an optimal balance of skills and 
backgrounds). 
At a more general level, we assume that tribunal clusters will aim to cultivate a 
shared organisational culture, which might include an overarching mission/ vision 
statement and common standards of excellence for tribunals within the group. The 
accountability documents now required under the Tribunals Act in Ontario require 
each cluster to develop and make public service standards, publish an MOU with 
the Government, an annual report and a variety of ethics documents (conflict of interest 
codes, etc).77 
A shared organisational culture will necessarily be shaped by and interrelated to 
other aspects of the cluster, such as the presence of a strong unified leadership and 
knowledge and information sharing between members. As Bacon observes: 
features such as the level of interaction between members are both a manifestation and an 
 underlying cause of the organisational culture within an amalgamated tribunal. This indicates 
that, far from being an inexorable given, organisational culture is something that, to some 
extent, can be controlled and engineered with positive effect.78 
Overall, Bacon’s study concludes that the VCAT had been more successful at 
capitalising on structural and procedural reforms to implement new mechanisms that 
improve access to justice compared to the ADT in New South Wales. The ADT had 
devolved into what Bacon calls a ‘disjunctive institutional culture’, in which relatively 
disconnected parts of the organisation operate at varying levels of formality, make 
arbitrary decisions about workload distribution and caseassignments to members, and 
have little or no adherence to a common vision for the organisation as a whole. Despite 
the fact that the ADT appears to be organised more closely along the lines of a unified 
structure, the lines between previously independent tribunals often remain rigid 
barriers to knowledge transfer and the development of procedural innovations.79 By 
contrast, some of the benefits that Bacon observes from VCAT’s experience are: 
increased consistency in decisionmaking where members interact frequently to 
share knowledge and ideas; increased member and staff satisfaction, leading to 
better productivity; a more functional organisation overall, adherence to a common set 
of values and shared aims; and an improved public profile for all tribunals or 
units within the organisation, leading to increased independence from government 
and greater legitimacy in the public view. 
 
1 Shared rules, procedures and practices 
One way to measure the effectiveness of tribunal clustering for streamlining and 
improving cluster-wide procedures is to track the diffusion of specific practices within 
the cluster. Bacon uses the example of how Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
techniques have been adopted and applied within different VCAT Lists following the 
initial amalgamation.80 Particular divisions, such as the Planning List, which had 
 previously used mediation practices infrequently saw a dramatic increase in the use of 
mediation after the VCAT was formed. 
Bacon attributes the spread in mediation practice at VCAT to at least three causes. 
First, informal member communications were a main source of diffusion, linked to 
increased opportunities for members to interaction.81 Second, the VCAT’s 
leadership designed a periodic mediation newsletter to formalise some aspects of 
information sharing. Third, the VCAT appointed a Principle Mediator with a mandate 
for promoting the use of mediation throughout the organisation, such as by organising 
meetings and information sessions and inviting guest speakers to present to the 
membership. 
The ‘spread’ of these types of practices is a good example of how the idea of 
institutional memory inherent to the cluster concept can be used to promote 
positive reforms. For example, those tribunals coming into the cluster with a strong 
foundation in mediation practices can be tapped as a primary resource for promoting 
similar practices throughout the cluster. This feature suggests important benefits in 
the context of Ontario, where ADR practices tend to vary widely between tribunals. 
 
2 Shared membership and cross appointments 
Bacon’s research finds at least two benefits of cross-appointing members between 
tribunal lists or divisions. The primary benefit was that cross-appointments created a 
means of breaking down some of the cultural barriers between separate subject-matter 
divisions by encouraging members to share knowledge, be open to new learning, and 
actively participate in the process of cultural change. The VCAT and ADT diverged 
widely on this feature, with cross-appointments being far more common in the VCAT. 
Bacon attributes much of the VCAT’s success to innovations in cross-appointing 
members.82 
Field interviews with tribunal members indicated that changes on this front started 
 small and grew gradually as new norms start to emerge. At the initial stage, cross-
appointments may simply lead to a greater recognition and comprehension of areas of 
overlap between units (ie tribunals within a cluster). For example, after VCAT 
members were cross-appointed to the Guardianship List, these members began to 
quickly identify guardianship issues in hearings on matters from different lists, 
particularly when dealing with problems faced by elderly people and people with 
disabilities in areas such as residential tenancies. Recognition was then followed, over 
time, with attempts on behalf of members to provide active assistance or direction for 
those with issues or problems that fell across two or more Lists. 
A secondary benefit of cross-appointments is that they are likely to create better 
incentives to attract high-quality tribunal members. Bacon reports that the ability to sit as 
a cross-appointed member increased these adjudicators’ job satisfaction and contributed 
to improved career opportunities.83 
Issues related to full versus part time membership are also relevant here. Where a main 
objective of clustering is to share knowledge and effect cultural change across 
constituent tribunals, Bacon’s findings indicate that these processes may be facilitated by 
more full time as opposed to part time members. The reasons given by members at 
VCAT and ADT are relatively straightforward. Full time members will increase the 
ability of the membership overall to develop and retain corporate knowledge because 
they are more actively involved in the day-to-day works of the cluster. The increased 
physical presence of full time members also makes it easier to organise member training 
and meetings, and creates greater opportunities for informal exchanges between 
individuals. 
There can also be negative impacts, however, from decreasing the number of part-
time members. The main challenge flagged in Bacon’s research was that full time 
members in highly specialised areas might find it more difficult to retain their 
specialised expertise and skills in that field, given that they are unable to be 
 actively involved in actual practice.84 In professional areas such as engineering and 
land use planning, this could result in a growing disconnect between full time 
members’ knowledge/experience and the realities faced by the tribunals’ 
constituencies. 
 
3 Shared administrative support and services 
The VCAT and the ADT have apparently been equally successful at developing shared 
administrative services to suit their particular needs. But notably, positive outcomes 
such as improved efficiency, better staff training and development, and greater flexibility 
in mobilizing staff and resources to meet fluctuating workloads appear to be the result 
of both convergence and divergence at the administrative level. 
On the one hand, trends at both the VCAT and ADT toward case-based 
management systems common to all sections or lists within the tribunals represent a focus 
on ‘multi-skilling’ for individual staff members. This approach emphasises exposing 
individuals to a range of experiences on all aspects of a case, from beginning to 
end. On the other hand, the VCAT has retained some specialised administrative 
processes necessary to account for significant difference between Lists. For example, 
the VCAT has maintained two parallel electronic case management systems—one 
for the Residential Tenancies List and one for the rest of the Tribunal. The reason for 
this distinction is the very high caseload of the Residential Tenancies List, which 
handles more than 70,000 applications per year.85 
It is, of course, not necessary to have a formal cluster in order to realise these kinds 
of administrative efficiencies. Ontario’s Health Boards (the Health Professions Appeal and 
Review Board and the Health Services Appeal and Review Board) are not in a cluster but 
are supported by a shared secretariat through the Ministry of Health. 
 
 
 4 Leadership 
A main issue related to tribunal cluster leadership is the nature and degree of 
authority over each of the constituent tribunals. In tribunal clusters, central 
leadership will likely be the crucial pivot point in balancing between the cohesion of 
distinct sub-cultures and fostering the distinctiveness of constituent tribunals. 
Contrasting experiences at the VCAT and the ADT in this respect serve to 
illustrate the importance of strong leadership to make the cluster model successful. The 
VCAT’s original president, a Supreme Court judge, has been credited with playing a 
central role in the organisation’s success. Bacon attributes this result to the VCAT 
president’s personal commitment and vision, but also to the broad scope of 
discretion afforded to the president to shape the tribunal’s procedures and other 
structural features in response to demands of the tribunal’s users.86 By comparison, the 
ADT’s leader—similarly a judicial officer—was much more severely constrained in 
making important decisions about procedure and the structure of the ADT itself 
following amalgamation. For example, the ADT president held very limited power to 
cross-appoint members between divisions. This resulted in weak cohesion between 
the previous tribunals and severely curtailed the organisation’s ability to formulate a 
common vision and standards. Challenges facing the leadership of many tribunal 
clusters may of course be even greater than those recognised in Bacon’s study of the 
VCAT and the ADT, both of which have been designed in a detailed way to centralise 
decision-making power around a core executive. The scope of reforms in these 
jurisdictions, as well as the lens and language of tribunal amalgamation, create a 
default orientation toward strong leadership. Indeed, at first, the only concrete reality 
which makes a cluster a cluster may be the appointment of an Executive Chair (Social 
Justice Tribunals Ontario may be an example of this phenomenon). The nature of 
leadership roles within a cluster will also depend on the degree to which an 
Executive Chair is significantly involved in the administration of the tribunals, and on 
 the possibilities for associate chairs of each tribunal to take on aspects of corporate and 
jurisprudential leadership.87 For example, in Ontario the Tribunals Act permits the 
appointment of associate chairs, but does not make them mandatory, implying 
that the statute does not necessarily predetermine the particular roles of these 
leadership positions, where they exist, within the cluster. The leadership structure of 
these clusters will need to reflect evolving administrative and jurisprudential demands, 
both of the cluster as a whole and of 
particular tribunals, as they take shape. 
To conclude, in the search for best practices, the experience of jurisdictions such as 
Australia provides tangible direction. Such best practices include: 
§ Shared rules, procedures and practices such as mediation/ADR; 
§ Shared administrative and support services, as well as physical co-location; 
§  Cross-appointments and the development of a common administrative culture; 
§ Strong, cohesive leadership of the organisation. 
Given that structural reforms tend to fall along a spectrum (from co-location to 
tribunal clusters to amalgamation), policy makers should expect that opportunities to 
learn from experiences in other jurisdictions will continue to arise, even where reform 
strategies take on different forms. For example, recent changes in the UK, discussed 
above, may provide yet another comparative Commonwealth model that tribunal 
clusters can triangulate with as clusters continue to evolve. 
We turn now to the conclusion and move from a comparative and empirical 
analysis of cluster realities on the ground to some preliminary normative reflections 
on where the evolution of clusters ought to head in Ontario, Canada more broadly, and 
elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 E CONCLUSIONS 
The question Ontario’s administrative justice and government communities now wrestles 
with is: ‘Why clusters?’ 
The legislation containing the power to create such clusters, the Tribunals Act, is 
silent on their purpose. This silence is puzzling. Some clusters may be justified by 
shared subject matter (such as ELTO), while others may be justified by common 
qualities among parties before a cluster (such as the rights seekers involved in the 
SJTO), but neither cluster was handed a mandate in which this rationale, or any 
rationale, was made apparent. 
If you take the problem with administrative justice to be fragmentation, a lack of 
accessibility, duplication of resources, complexity of mandates and rules, and the lack 
of structural protections of independence or requirements of accountability, then 
clusters seem a half-measure at best. Why not bring all adjudicative tribunals 
together into a single amalgamated structure with different subject-matter sub-divisions, 
as in the UK? Clusters appear to mitigate rather than solve the problem of tribunals 
being caught up in ministerial silos, unable to coordinate, learn from each other or 
engage in economies of scale with respect to accessibility initiatives (like a common 
pool for translation and interpretation services). 
The very existence of a cluster suggests an ambivalence—big is better but not too 
big! There is, indeed, a quintessentially Canadian dimension to the half-way house of 
clusters. While clusters are difficult to defend against ideological purists, they reflect the 
kind of principled pragmatism that has fueled the development of administrative justice 
in Canada. 
The rhetoric surrounding the cluster initiative has cast it as a modernizing 
project. But the very notion of modernising suggests a process rather than an end point. 
While system coherence is a central goal of structural change, it may be overly 
optimistic to think that we can achieve that goal with a single sweeping set of reforms. 
 Different tribunals and their groups of users may have different needs at different times, 
and in our view some degree of flexibility to meet these varying needs is necessary. 
We believe that it is impossible to discuss the risks and benefits of tribunal 
clusters in a normative vacuum. A coherent and coordinated system of 
administrative justice is better able to deliver access to justice, public accountability and 
the fulfillment of statutory and policy objectives. It is for this reason that, in our view, 
clusters represent an important and positive first step, rather than a destination. We 
acknowledge that this is choosing to see the glass as half-full. Once clusters are in 
existence, however, if further evolution does not come, all too soon, the glass may come 
to appear half-empty! 
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